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BRITAIN  IN  EUROPE  - THE  FIRST  FOUR  YEARS  AND 
THE  FUTURE 
·  It is now  very nearly four  years  since Sir 
Christopher  Soames  and  I  set off on  the  adventure 
of being Britain's first  two  European  Commissioners. 
It was  a  journey full  of omens  for  the  future.  There 
was  fog  in the  Channel  and  the  Continent was  cut 
off.  Insteed of landing triumphantly at Brussels 
in a  'plane of the Queen's Flight,  we  were  diverted 
to the  small  provincial airport of Rotterdam.  There 
we  found  they  closed the airport  down  for  lunch,  and 
the air terminal  doors were  locked in our  faces. 
Christopher  Soames  and  I  can claim,  I  think,  to 
have  reasonably robust and resilient spirits,  but  I 
confess we  sagged  as  we  looked  at that locked door. 
I  remember  thinking at the  time what  an 
effective photograph it would  have made  for  an 
anti-l'1arket:  newspaper  - two  o£  B-.citainTs  leading 
enthusiasts  for  British entry facing  some  of the 
frustrations  and  diversions of actually getting 
into the  Community,  no  doubt with the  caption 
"So  t_his  is Europe!" 
It was  a  foretaste of  some  things  to  come. 
1973  v;as  the  year inwhich the  Corr.munity,  in  corrrrnon 
with  the  non-Communist  world,  was  hit  by  the  twin 
storms of inflation and  slump.  It culminated in 
the  qu.adrupling of oi  1  prices at  the  end of the  year, 
and  a  Summit  meeting which  I  attended in Copenhagen 
of inspissated Scandinaviqn  gloom. 
The  resu.lt  ~ms that  some  of  the  arguments  in 
the  popular debate about  British entry were  sunk 
v-;ithout  trace.  While  I  was  Hlnister for  Europe, 
the  Government  painstek.i.ngl.y  and  frankly vJoTked  out 
2·. that part of the price of conforming to the C.A.P. 
would  be  a  food  price rise of  12~% over  five  years. 
A  much  bigger rise took  place within five  months 
in 1973  for global  reasons  that had nothing to  do 
with British entry  - though  the  Common  Narket was 
of course made  the  scapegoat. 
The  truth is that  the  Connnunity  we  thought v7e 
were  joining - a  Conununity  of steady grovJth,  full 
employment  and  gradually converging economi.es  -
changed its character in 1973 under  the pressure of 
world-wide  economic  forces. 
I  hasten to add that what  did not change was 
the case  for British entry  - indeed,  as  I  shall  hope 
to show,  it had  been  strengthened.  But  what  the 
economic  convulsion of 1973  proved was  the  folly 
one of democracy's  weaknesses  - of seeking ::to  determine 
historic long-term issues on the basis of the  short-term 
political polemic. 
1974,  and half of 1975,  produced e  neH  element 
of uncertainty into Britain's  journey into Europe. 
1974  \\f&S  the  yec..r  of renegotiation and  1975  the 
year of  the Referendum.  In  the renegotiation,  the 
rest of the  Corr.munity  showed  a  great  deal  of 
patience  and  a  desire to  find  a  formula,  including 
a  cor_rective  mechanism  for  the  budget,  which \vOuld 
enable the British Government  to  recommend  the 
British people  to stay in the  Community.  Bri.tain, 
on  the other hand,  should not underestimate  the 
degree to which  she has used up  the  immense  reserves 
of respect  and  goodwill which  she  enjoyed when  she 
joined. in 1973. 
Looking  back nov.r  over  the last  four  yeD-rs,  I 
think that  Christopher  S0arr:2s  ancl  I,  and  the  r<1any 
others  from  Britain who  in one ,,,ay  or anotb.c:r 
committed themselves  in 1973  to helping Brttain 
to  land in th:ts  strange territory of Community 
Europe,  can claim that we  have explored the  new 
4  .. ground,  blazed trails,  and built bridges Hithout 
losing too many  scalps  in the  process.  The  natives 
heve in fact  proved to  be  friendly-,  and embarrassingly 
still manage  to retain a  rather higher opinion of us 
these days  than we  seem  to  be  able  to sustain 
amongst  ourselves. 
Many  fears  about  our entry into this new  terrltory 
have  proved unfounded.  No  hordes  of Sicilian peasants 
have,  as  was  sometimes  feared  in the more  conservative 
press in this country,  turned up  in the  streets of 
Tunbridge Wells.  The  fear that we  were  all going 
to  end up washing dmm  a  uniform Euro-bread with  a 
ha11nonised  Euro-beer  seems  to  have  been  dispelled. 
And  in Development  Areas  (and  indeed all over Europe), 
the  hoardings  are  going up  on  new  industriel develop-
ments,  proudly  announcing  that they are  taking place 
with the help of the new  European Regional  Development 
Fund.  No  punitive ransom has  had  to be  surrendered to 
the  Community  Budget.  Indeed,  with that unexpectedness 
which  characterises  Community  affairs,  the  Common 
Agricultural  Policy,  which was  understandably 
regarded in Britain as  being organised for  the 
benefit of French  farmers,  has  turned into  a  benefit 
for  British housewives  to the  tune  at present of 
around  £1.3 million  a  day,  without  the help of any 
corrective mechanism.  It is a  situation that 
cannot last,  but  I  must  ·confess  there is a  certain 
rough  justice i.n  this unexpected turn of events. 
Nor  can  I  see why  it should  be  regarded  as  acceptnble 
and  inevitable when  the agricultural budget  finances 
uneatable and unsellable surpluses,  but  against  the 
natural order of things when it keeps  down  prices 
for  British housewives  and  keeps  up  the  export markets 
for  Danish ?nd other  fa~mers. 
The  arrival of Roy  Jenkins  as  President of the 
Commission  and  of the  United Kingdom  as  the Presidential 
Government  of the  Community  in fact represe:-;ts  the  end 
of one chapter and  the beginning of another.  Rather 
6. belatedly,  in my  view,  it represents the point 
at which  the United Kingdom  becomes  irrevocably a 
whole-hearted member  of the  European  CoilUliUnity. 
I  detect  a  certain sense of disappointment in 
the rest of the  Community  that  the  remarkable 
political success of the Referendum was  not 
exploited more  fully  by  the  Government  at the 
time.  Nevertheless,  during the next  six months 
large numbers  of Ministers and literally scores 
of civil servants will have  the  d.ny  to day 
responsibility of steering the  Community.  The 
prize I  hope  for is that this will  produce  the 
psychological-change of converting an off-shore 
political establishment into a  whole-hearted 
participant in the  search for  Comrrru.nity  solutions. 
From now  on  I  hope  that within the United Kingdom 
it will  be  possible to deal with the many  complex 
issues of the  development  of Community  policy,  not 
in the artificial black and white  terms of whether 
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it is good or bad  for  Britain to  be  in the  Corrmnlnity, 
~ut how  best Britain can play her part in the 
development  of successful  Community  policy. 
I  turn therefore  from  the more  myopic  view of 
Brita:t.n's position within the  Commu.nity  to the 
larger questions  of the future  of the  Community 
itself.  I  ought  to  admit  straight away  that being 
a  Member  of the  European  Commission,  far  from  being 
a_  help in making  this  assessment,  tends  to  be  a 
hindrance.  One  of the disadvantages  of the  European 
Commission is that it is situated right in  t:-ke  lii.eu'l!~: 
of the Community  forest.  Day  by  day we  have  endless 
and  time-consuming  arguments  about  the management  of 
some  con1.er· of  the  forest,  and it i.s  the  peculiar 
hand:i.Cclp  of  f>  .. .:;··:pean  Co:.::!. ssinner:s  thc:lt  \•Ji t I·, out 
constant effort they are unable  to see  the wood  for 
the  trees.  Now  that  I  am  about  to  be  li.berated,  I 
will do  my  be:::::t  to  strHce  a  fair balance  ~,heet. 
8. I  start with the positive side of the  Community 
over the  last four  years,  since it is far  too often 
overlooked.  We  take  too easily for granted,  for 
example,  the  fundamental  fac~ of Franco-German 
reconciliation,  which represents  the very 
foundations  of the  European  Community  and which 
has made  inconceivable  the kind of Franco-German 
conflicts which have afflicted the  Continent  three 
times in the last hundred years  and have  twice 
provoked world wars.  We  overlook the  fact  that, 
if there  had  been no  European  Community  over  the 
last four years,  then  the  recession through which 
we  have  been passing -vmuld  have degenerated into the 
kind of  comp~titive protectionism and  trade war  wh~ch 
we  knew  so  tragically in the Thirties.  The  considerable 
success which  the European  Community  has  had in its 
foreign relations,  especially with the United States 
and Japan,  has  helped to prevent this. 
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lf Britain had  chosen  to go  it alone in the 
Referendum,  is it conceivable  that cur Western 
European partners  and her transatlantic allies 
would  have  given us  the  support we  have  received 
to win our  economic  battles  ?  Is it not  more 
likely that '\vithout  the  Conu:nuni ty Britain would  have 
slid over  the precipice .into bankruptcy last summer? 
Again,  the European  Community  can fairly claim 
t~ have  led  t~e Western world in new  techniques  of 
partnership with the  developing countries of the 
Third World.  The  Lome  Convention,  with its concept 
of partnership and with its ne\v  techniques of 
guaranteeing the  export earnings  of the  developing 
countries,  has  blazed a  trail T.,:rhich  the \·JOrld  cs  a 
,,,hole  in the  UNCTAD  negoti.:ltions  is seeking  to  follow. 
As  I  have  found  to my  cost, it is always  easier 
to make  progress in external policy,  vJhere  there is 
an overriding common  interest amongst  the member 
10. nations of the  Connnunity,  than it is 'in  inte·~~f:rl 
policy,  where national interests come  in direct 
conflict with esch other.  Nevertheless,  the 
establishment of the  Community's  Regional  Develop-
ment  Fund was  a  milestone in the efforts to  establish 
the principle of the  transfer of resources  from  ttrt! 
richer to the  poorer  areas  across  the internal 
frontiers  of the  Community.  This  may  be  put  in 
simpler,  but more  radical human  terms  as  the moment 
at which  the  tax-payer in Hamburg  is persuaded to 
put his hand in his pocket  and  pay  sotne  of his  taxes 
to  support not merely his  fellow  Bava:rian  - whiiC'lil  i·s 
no  doubt difficult enough politically - but his 'fellow 
European citizen in the  South of Italy or the West. 
of Ireland.  This is the  beginning of the creation 
of a  European consciousness,  not only at the  level 
of governments,  but at the  level of the ordinary 
citizen. 
12. 
The  Community  has  a  formidable  array of Funds  -
agricultural,  social,  coal  and  steel funds.  The 
significance of the  birth of the Regional  Fund  is thet i't 
is leading to the  development,  slowly  and  gradually,  of 
the  concept that all these  funds  should  be used together 
as  part of a  coherent strategy to promote  the  convergence 
of national economies  and to close the  gap  between the 
richer and the poorer regions of Europe. 
Finally,  there has  been  the  imme.nsely  significant 
decision  to hold Direct Elections to the  Europeen 
Parliament  by  the middle  of 1978.  Changing :t'l\e 
electo.ral  system does  not,  of course,  change  the 
power of the Parliament  amongst  the Community 
institutions.  Bt.lt  can  enyone  believe that a 
directly elected European Parliament will  be  conten.t 
\vith its present mainly consultative powers,  or 
indeed with its present nomadic  existence  betwe·en 
Luxembourg  and  Strasbourg  and  Brussels  ? So  much  for the positive side of the balance 
sheet.  The  most  immediate  items  on  the negative 
side have  been the failure adequately to reform the 
agricultural policy and  too limited progress  on 
energy policy,  where  the fateful  implications of 
the nuclear option have not  been properly considered. 
It is remarkable  and regrettable that there is still 
no  Community  position on  the export of nuclear 
tecl:mology. 
But  the more  fundamental  feature  on  the debit 
side can be  stated very simply,  in one  sentence,  and 
indeed in a  few  words  - ~divergence instead of 
convergence'.  This is an economic  Community.  Its 
aim is economic  integration leading to political 
unity.  Until  1973,  the prospects  for this,  although 
~here were  problems,  were  good.  Since  1973 inflation 
and recession have  blown national economies  on 
divergent courses.  To  get the  Community  back on  a 
convergent course requires  above  all an immense  act 
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of political will  by  the Member  Governments,  as well 
as  strong and wise  leadership  from  the new 
Commission. 
What  is at stake is very great  indeed.  Lord 
Davies,  whose  memory  we  honour  tonigh~,  devoted 
his  energy  and his wealth ih the  ~hirties to the 
need  for  a  viable world.order  whi~h would  prevent 
a  second world war.  Today  the David  Davies  Institute 
devotes itself to the probtems  of creating a  world 
economic  order that will prevent  the .kind of trade 
war which would  certainly be disastrous  for living 
standa~ds everywhere  and  might well degenerate into 
something much  more  violent. 
Hhen,  i.n  the first year of Britai.n's entry 
into the  Community,  producers  quadrupled the  price 
of oil,  they  gave notice that ,.7e  were  entering into 
a  new  period in which  a  new  balance of economic 
power  had  to be established between the countries 
14. '  .  ~ 
who  produced the world's raw materials,  who  were by 
and  large the poorest countries in the world,  and 
the countries who  used these raw  materials,  who  were 
by  and large the richest countries in the world.  An 
immediate  consequence of these events in the.  industrial 
world. has  been to  eno  the post war era of affluence 
and  full  employm~nt.  Unemployment  has  ceased to  be 
a  passing cyclical  problem and has  become  chronic  and 
structural.  Adapting to the new  situation needs 
massive  ne\-7  investment  and  that means  reduced 
consumption.  To  get the politic.al consent  for these 
changes  imposes  big strains on  European  democracy.  lt 
also places new  obstacles in the path of progress 
towards  European unity. 
The  case for European  economic unity is stronger, 
not weaker in this situation - but harder to achieve. 
Internally it would  be  fatal  for all of us,  if we 
started trying to export our unemployment  to each 
other instead of trying to agree a  common  strategy. 
Externally,  without unity Europe  remains  at an 
immense  disadvantage alongside Japan or the United 
States, which never has  to suffer the damage  to its 
negotiating position of California speaking at the 
table with an opposite voice  from  New  York. 
~he threat of a  breakdown  in the world  economy, 
although very real,  is a great deal  less dramatic 
than the  facts of internal ruin and external 
aggression which  compelled the  creation of European 
unity in the  immediate  post-war years.  The  Western 
European nation state,  having recovered  from  the 
shock pf the  second world war,  has  consolidated 
itself.  Its reactions  to these cataclysmic world 
economic  changes  tends  to  be  a  short  term political 
reacU_on,  where  the  governments'  eyes  i.nevitably 
are on  the next  general  election.  Yet  the  fact is 
that  the  economic  realities are the  same  for all 
"  \Vestern  European  Governments,  whatever their 
ideological complexion.  No  Government  in the 
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Community  has much  room  to manoeuvre  betweer  the 
Scylla and  Charybdis,  or inflation and  recession. 
Every government  - whether of Left or Right  - is 
faced with the kno1;..rledge  that it ought  to  take 
unpopular political decisions,  which may  endanger 
its survival at the next election.  Oppositions 
of Right and Left,  if they are honest  to  themselves, 
if not to their electorates,  know  that, if they are 
thrust into power,  they will fact exactly the  same 
realities and  the  same  limited room  for manoeuvre. 
If these inward-looking national attitudes 
persist in Community  Europe,  the leadership of the 
search for  a  new  economic  balance of power  on  the 
part of the  developed world will  be left to the 
United States  and Japan,  with Western  Europe 
exercising what  influence it can  from  the side-
lines.  Our  children would live in a  world where 
the essential decisions  affecting their future would 
be  taken  by  others in their own  interests.  But it 
would  also mean  that the West  as  a  whole would  be 
weakened  and  the world would  lose the constructive 
contribution and  influence which Western  E~rope 
can bring to bear in this historic conflict. 
Within the  European  Community  are the  great 
form~r colonial  powers  of Europe.  Their relations 
with the Third World  in Africa,  Asia  and  the 
Caribbean have  that peculiar degree  of intimacy 
Fhich is one  of the  remarkable  by-products  of the 
c-olonial  conflicts of the past.  Eight  times  out 
of ten at  the United  Nations  this year  Community 
Europe:  has  agreed  to cast  a  common  vote,  and  there 
hsve  been  times when  the relations  between  the 
developing  and  the  developed world have  come  to 
positions  of  particular difficvlty,  and it has 
been  the countries of the  European  Community  that 
have helped to keep  things moving.  These  times  have 
been  too  feH,  but  the  irmnense  potentiality of the 
European  Community,  if it can find the e::onomic  and 
18. '  .. 
political means  to  speak with a  single voice,  to play 
a  crucial role in creating a  new  economic  order,  has 
certainly been demonstrated. 
How  can  the  moment~~ to-economic  convergence  and 
political unity be  restored  ?  The  directly elected 
European Parliament will help to produce  a  new  cli.mE~.te, 
but it will  take  time.  Will  the continued  economic 
div~rgence and its associated monetary  problems 
produce  a  crisis situation \vhich will  compel  Nember 
Governments  to move  out of their conservative national 
moulds  and  seek a  wider  Corrnnunity  solution  ?  The 
Community  has  come  near to that position once or 
twlce  over the last four  years  and it rn:!y  happen again. 
There is an additional dimension to  this  problem 
provided by  the demand  of Greece  to join the European 
Community,  and of the likelihood that Greece 'tvill  be 
follov.1ed  by  a  number of other l·!editerro.nea""l  countries. 
The  political arguments  for  seeking that kind of 
enlargement are very strong.  Greece  and  Portugal 
have recently  emerged  from despotic rule  .:n1ti  clE~n~uc.r:-·acy 
is struggling to  be  rehorn in Spain.  The  rolitir.::.pl 
backing of the  European  CorrnTil1~~-ty vJ:l'.ll  \vi. th0ut  <.loubt 
be  .:m  irmnense  support  to the  dem·~1cratic forces  in 
these  countrj_es .and  a  grea·t  setfeguard  ag:::.inst  any 
reversion to authoritarian rule.  , Nevertl':td.Ess,  thr~y 
add  to the  econcmi.c  prob).ems  I  he1ve  been describing. 
20. 
I  believe that the  Europc.:m  Communi..ty  must  rr:f pond 
to the  poU. t:icel  appe.:.l  of  thc:>e  ~·1edi terrancRn countries, 
but  mtJS":  n~vertheless face  the  c.onseque;1ces  for the 
development  of  the  Ccmr:tm:L ty ins  ti. tutions ·ph:tch '.vill 
be  represented  hy  the:i.r  membcrr,;h~.pe 
Ny  juclc,::nent  is  t!:-~at  in An  :..mportant  sen~c: 
the  European  Cor.:nnn.i~y is  nO\\.'  ir..destructLble.  Its 
ro(,ts  h::~ve  anpe  dc,e'1  enou,.,.h  e.nd  enough  common  •  ---::  (  ~,  .•  .L  •  _,'  •.  .  .(")  -
interests have;  b~cn -:rc2ted to  f'nsure its survivhl. -- ---------------~------------
The  real  question therefore is not whether the 
Community will survive,.  but what kind of Corrmunity 
it will be.  The  real choice  seems- to me  to.  be  one 
of the possibility of an enlarged  Corrnnunity  developing - .  . 
or perhaps more  exactly degenerating  - into a  largely 
inter-governmental  organisation operating a  Customs 
Union  and  some  other common  policies.  It would  be  a 
sort of glorified O.E.C.D.  The  alternative is to 
con~inue the efforts to develop an integrated Economic 
and Monetary Union,  which will enable the Community 
to exercise real political weight in world  affairs  • 
.  /·· 
If this is to happen in a  Community  of ten,  or 
eleven or  tw~lve, it will be vital not to stand in 
the way  of those countries which are able to integrate 
their economic  and  monetary  arrangements  at a  faster 
~ate than others.  Indeed,  if the massive ·problems 
of economic  development which  the Mediterranean 
countries will bring with them  into the Community 
are to be  tackled on  an  adequate  scale by  the 
transfer of Community  resources,  it will  be necessary 
to encourage  the countries capable of a  faster rate 
of integration to  do  so  a.s  a  means  of generating 
the \..realth  to help others.  But  the  economic  and 
political consequences of such  a  development would  need 
to  be  given a  great deal more  though~ than they have 
so  far received:  integ~ation is ::a  political as well 
as  an  economic  process  and it will be vital to ensure 
that  the political unity of the Community  is maintained 
in respect of its institutions. :  The  question for 
Btitain in this situationwill be whether  by that 
time in the _Eighties we  't..rill  have  shown  our capacity 
to use the  bonus  of North  Sea oil sufficiently Hisely 
to  be part of the  economic  patver-house of the  Cornnru.ni ty. 
~- 1-, .- .:'  _,-., 
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e  good  deal  of pragmatic  scorn on  the grand designs 
of the past for  an  Economic  and Nonetary Union.  One 
metaphoric version of old fashioned  British common 
22. .  '  ..  . 
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sense  that keeps  cropping up is the proposition 
that blue•prints are all very well,  but you can 
never build a  house  starting with the roof.  It is 
... 
at least equally true that, if in building a  house 
painstakingly brick by brick from the  foundatians 
you slow down  almost  to a  standstill before the · 
walls  are  completed and  the roof is on,  thenin 
stormy weather the half  fin~shed structure becomes 
so useless that it is likely to be  abandoned.  The 
real challenge to the  Comnrunity  in the period 
immediately ahead is to recover some  of the vision 
of the original architects of the European 
Community  and  .. to  generate  enough of the political 
will to restore the momentum  of the  building of 
that house of Europe  and  to  gets· its roof on  as 
quickly as  possible  • 
.. 
_t 
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l 